Sunday, February 27, 2011

Rosmahkhan is my name Do I look like a liar? Queen of all Qeen Control Yes she said I controls my husband Najib

Rosmahkhan is my name Do I look like a liar? Queen of all Qeen Control Yes she said I controls my husband Najib

Rosmahkhan is my name Do I look like a liar? Queen of all Qeen Control Yes she said I controls my husband Najib

Posted: 27 Feb 2011 12:12 PM PST

Posted by muslimmalaysia786


Queen Control

the basic idea is to lock down your opponent's spell and traps and bring out your allure queen with no resistance. Solidarity and shrink are there to protect her from battle if she can't steal anything. also there to boost her attack. 2 my bodys and 2 defender to protect her from anything else because as long as she is equiped she can't be destroyed by battle. use Magician's Circle to search her out and Royal Magical Library for extra draw. She basically eats everything at lv 7 and your opponent can't do much with their spells and traps gone.

Hello voters! Lemme introduce myself- my name is Rosmah. I am your new Prime Minister! Chillax, guys. That a joke. But seriously, it's time you got to know who I am. The real me. Let's not get into the surname at this point. I am 38 years old. Which means i am old enough to decide.
Old enough to know what i want in life (everything !) . Not because I am a spoilt brat. Not because I believe it's my birthright. But because I am worth it! Well, are you ready to hear this? I want to be a politician. A top politician. Like the rest of my family. We start at the top, and stay there! Lucky, na? My family has been an amazing PM. My hubby was super amazing .


Dinner 1Malaysia NGO

Posted: 27 Feb 2011 07:52 AM PST

Story to Follow
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Time: 03:08 More in News & Politics

Rosmah: I don' look like a liar, do I?

Posted: 27 Feb 2011 07:12 AM PST

Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak's wife Rosmah Mansor today defended herself against what she called opposition "lies" about her, during an unlikely by-election appearance at the all-important Felda settlements in Kerdau today. Hitting the campaign trail to whip up support for BN's candidate Syed Ibrahim Syed Ahmad, the self-proclaimed 'First Lady of Malaysia' urged voters to reject the allegations and lies brandished against her by Pakatan Rakyat. "Look at my face until you are satisfied. Do I look like a liar? I don't, right?," she told some 200 settlers of Felda Jengka 25.
Views: 1
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Time: 04:47 More in News & Politics

Jabatan agama ambil alih semua masjid di Kerdau

Posted: 27 Feb 2011 02:45 AM PST

Sejurus selepas mulanya tempoh rasmi berkempen, calon PAS Hassanuddin Salim mendakwa Jabatan Agama Islam Pahang kini mengambil alih secara sementara semua 22 masjid di DUN Kerdau. Dakwanya, tindakan itu akan memberikan kelebihan kepada lawannya Syed Ibrahim Syed Ahmad daripada BN yang mudah berkempen di rumah ibadat tersebut dan tidak memberikan peluang sama rata kepadanya.
Views: 104
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Time: 08:42 More in News & Politics

PPP President on 'Interlok'

Posted: 27 Feb 2011 02:29 AM PST

PPP President M Kayveas commented on the recent Interlok issue, a novel deemed degrading and humiliating to the Indian community, as well as the chinese in Malaysia. It was asked to be banned by many individuals, NGOs and Indian based political parties.
Views: 123
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Time: 03:04 More in News & Politics

Barisan confident, Pakatan face uphill battle

Posted: 27 Feb 2011 01:14 AM PST

Interviews with G Palanivel, Kayveas, Xavier Jayakumaran and Anthony Loke on the issues in Merlimau and their chances of winning.
Views: 112
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Time: 03:39 More in News & Politics

Uthaya, 108 others arrested to quash HRP rally

Posted: 27 Feb 2011 12:56 AM PST

By about 11.45am, the crowd had swelled to a procession of about 200 moving towards the contingent police headquarters. Water cannon and other Federal Reserve Unit (FRU) trucks were seen on standby at the headquarters. During the march, the police drove two patrol cars into the crowd, forcing the HRP/Hindraf supporters to break up into two lines and onto the sidewalks flanking the road. rally proceeds to Pudu IPKUpon arrival at the contingent police headquarters, the demonstrators demanded that Kuala Lumpur deputy police chief Amar Singh release those arrested within the hour. As of 11.40am, according to a police source, at least 183 have been arrested over the aborted HRP/Hindraf rally. If the police refused to heed their demands, said the demonstrators, they would camp outside the police station. They made the assurance, however, that they would not block traffic. At a press conference in the police station, meanwhile, Kuala Lumpur police chief Zulkifli Abdullah clarified the number of those arrested was 109, not 183 as earlier reported.
Views: 302
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Time: 06:53 More in News & Politics

Hindraf anti-racism/Interlok rally: more arrests

Posted: 26 Feb 2011 11:20 PM PST

In addition to Uthayakumar, scores of other persons suspected of being participants in the rally have also been taken in by the police this morning - seven at KLCC and 10 at the Renaissance Hotel. Their identities have not yet been ascertained. As at 10am, it has been estimated that about 100 people have been arrested in various parts of Kuala Lumpur. The police appeared to be stopping and arresting anyone suspected as Hindraf supporters, especially Indians, who were found walking in the streets of Kuala Lumpur.
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Time: 03:23 More in News & Politics

Hindraf anti-Umno racism rally - Jayadass arrested

Posted: 26 Feb 2011 10:48 PM PST

Police arrested Human Rights Party (HRP) leader P Uthayakumar and erected roadblocks around Kuala Lumpur in the bid to stop an 'anti-racism' rally organised by it and its affiliate Hindraf in the city centre today. The rally is also aimed at protesting the controversial 'Interlok' novel by national laureate Abdullah Hussain, which has been criticised for containing racial slurs and stereotypes against the Indian and Chinese communities.
Views: 631
10 ratings
Time: 02:29 More in News & Politics

Former Perak MB on Merlimau

Posted: 26 Feb 2011 09:23 PM PST

Nizar Jamaluddin, former Menteri besar of Perak commented on the N 27 Merlimau by-election. He compares and analyses the voting patterns and the level of exposure to national issues. More stories :
Views: 132
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Time: 03:44 More in News & Politics

Lessons From Egypt’s Uprising

Posted: 27 Feb 2011 07:46 AM PST

By Adam Hanieh (School of Oriental and African Studies, UK)

The events of the last weeks are one of those historical moments where the lessons of many decades can be telescoped into a few brief moments and seemingly minor occurrences can take on immense significance. The entry of millions of Egyptians onto the political stage has graphically illuminated the real processes that underlie the politics of the Middle East. It has laid bare the long-standing complicity of the U.S. and other world powers with the worst possible regimes, revealed the empty and hypocritical rhetoric of United States President Barack Obama and other leaders, exposed the craven capitulation of all the Arab regimes, and demonstrated the real alliances between these regimes, Israel and the USA. These are political lessons that will long be remembered.

The uprisings have also shown the remarkable fragility of the nepotistic regimes across the Arab world. These regimes depended upon their networks of secret police (mukhabarat) and thugs (baltajiya), and inculcated a seemingly unassailable pessimism about the possibility of change that was reflected in the biting sarcasm of Arab political humour. But these mechanisms of control simply evaporated as people shed their fear. The Arabic word intifada conveys this sense of shaking off, and the sight of millions of people losing their fear and gaining a sense of the possible will long remain one of the most enduring memories of this revolutionary moment. The historic significance of this process should not be lost – there has quite literally never been a moment of such potential in the Arab world.

The purpose of this article is not to recount the story of these uprisings or to attempt to predict the possible future scenarios of Egypt's revolutionary process. Rather, it aims to draw out some of the broader implications for the Middle East as a whole, and to argue that these struggles are best understood through the lens of class struggle. These recent uprisings show decisively that class remains the key dynamic to understanding any social transformation and, simultaneously, that the ways in which 'class struggle' is expressed will take a variety of forms that constantly disrupts any reductionist economistic readings.

Capitalism in the Middle East

What this means is that we need to think of 'politics' and 'economics' – which we are accustomed to conceive of as separate spheres – as fused and part of the same struggle. To claim that the Egyptian demonstrators are primarily concerned with Hosni Mubarak and so-called 'political freedoms' – which has been the dominant narrative of U.S. and other world leaders and much of the corporate media coverage – is to distort and misread the nature of these protests. Clearly the protests have encompassed a wide variety of social layers with different demands, but their overall logic is inextricably tied to broader questions of capitalism in the Middle East. These questions include: (1) The global economic crisis and the nature of neoliberalism in Egypt, and (2) Egypt's role in sustaining patterns of U.S. domination in the Middle East. These questions are neither solely 'political' nor 'economic' but revolve primarily around which class rules Egypt and in whose interest the Egyptian state functions. The nature of Mubarak's rule cannot be separated from these questions, which is why the struggle against political despotism is inevitably inter-twined with the dynamic of class struggle. It is through this multifaceted understanding of class that these uprisings are best understood.

An Expression of the Global Crisis

Thousands of workers from several oil and gas companies are on strike, protesting in front of the Ministry of Petroleum, in Nasr City.

The first illustration of the class character of these popular uprisings is their link to the chain of protests that have erupted over the last three years in the wake of the global economic crisis. This is the Arab world's response to that crisis and powerfully confounds the dominant narrative – unfortunately repeated by some radical economists – that the economic crisis was largely confined to the advanced capitalist core and that somehow the so-called 'emerging markets' had escaped the worst effects. Decades of neoliberalism have tied the Egyptian economy into the capitalist world market in a very uneven fashion and, as a consequence, the crisis was to have a devastating impact on the majority of the country's population.

There have been a variety of mechanisms through which this transmission of crisis has taken place. First, the Middle East (and particularly the North Africa region) is highly dependent upon exports to Europe and these have fallen precipitously due to the drop in demand that followed economic contraction. World Bank figures show that Egypt's year-on-year growth rates of merchandise exports to the EU dropped from 33% in 2008 to -15% by July 2009.[1] Similarly, Tunisia and Morocco saw the total value of their world exports fall by 22 per cent and 31 per cent respectively in 2009 – leading the World Bank to note that these countries were facing the worst recessions in six decades.[2]

A second transmission mechanism has been the curtailment of worker remittances on which the Middle East is highly dependent. In the case of Egypt, workers tend to migrate to the Gulf countries, Libya and Jordan. For the rest of North Africa, this labour migration tends to be toward Europe. Egypt is the largest recipient of remittances in the Middle East, representing approximately 5 per cent of national GDP. With the mass layoffs that continue to characterize the global crisis – particularly in sectors such as construction – remittances have fallen rapidly. Egypt experienced a massive contraction of 18 per cent in remittances from 2008 to 2009. For a region where these flows form the basic survival mechanism for millions of people, the decline has had devastating consequences.

These effects also need to be placed alongside the other more recent feature of the crisis – the spiraling cost of basic food and energy items. There is no space to discuss the complex reasons behind this rising commodity inflation except to note that it is another aspect of the crisis itself – partially resulting from the large quantities of extra cash pumped into the system to ameliorate the crisis in the core countries, particularly the U.S. program of quantitative easing.[3] Once again, the effects have been magnified in much of the Middle East. In Egypt, annual food price inflation accelerated to 18.9 per cent in January 2011 from 17.2 per cent in December. These rapid increases in prices are essentially a form of severe wage cuts for those segments of the population that are compelled to spend most of their income on basic items.


But any mapping of this crisis needs to go beyond the immediate results of global slowdown and be situated within the three decades of neoliberal 'reforms' that Egypt has experienced. What neoliberalism has done is to make the country much more vulnerable to the crisis itself – massively widening the levels of inequality and, simultaneously, undermining potential mechanisms of social support. Precisely because of these outcomes of neoliberalism, the effects of the crisis were sharply concentrated on the most vulnerable layers of Egyptian society. At the same time, and this expresses the essential class character of the neoliberal project, a tiny elite benefited enormously from these economic measures.

This reading of Egypt's neoliberal experience runs directly counter to the account of international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. The IMF was to claim in February 2010, for example, that Egypt had been "resilient to the crisis" because "sustained and wide-ranging reforms since 2004 had reduced fiscal, monetary, and external vulnerabilities, and improved the investment climate." According to the IMF, the Egyptian government's successful implementation of neoliberalism had "bolstered the economy's durability and provided breathing space for appropriate policy responses."[4]

The IMF finds evidence for Egypt's resilience in the relatively high GDP growth rates that the country has managed to sustain. From 2006 to 2008 growth was around 7 per cent annually and in 2009, when much of the world was experiencing negative GDP growth, Egypt recorded 4.6 per cent. But what this GDP-centric account does is to ascribe a general assessment of a country's health on the basis of aggregate macro-statistics. Embedded in this approach is the unspoken assumption that a growth trend at the aggregate level is good for the population as a whole. It hides the reality that capitalism is an exploitative system and the outcome of the unfettered market typically means that overall growth results in the widening of inequality. It is, in other words, a statistical expression of the 'trickle-down effect.' Egypt is a perfect example of the reality behind this myth: neoliberalism has produced rapid growth rates but, simultaneously, it has led to worsening living standards for the majority of the population and the increased concentration of wealth in the hands of a tiny minority (literally just a handful of families).

According to official government statistics poverty increased from 20 per cent to 23.4 per cent from 2008 to 2009. This in itself is a significant increase but official statistics need to be approached with a large degree of skepticism. The official poverty line is set at an absurdly low rate – in fact, some 40 per cent of Egyptians live on less than $2 per day. The official unemployment rate is recorded at around 9 per cent, but again the reality is completely different – more than half of those outside of agriculture are found in the "informal sector" and are not properly recorded in the unemployment statistics. These informal workers live in a society that lacks any decent social provisions for education, health or broader welfare. It is estimated, for example, that one-third of the Egyptian population is illiterate. The demographic question also looms large here. In a country where the leadership consists of men in their 80s, youth make up more than 90 per cent of the jobless.

The onset of neoliberalism in Egypt is associated with the series of policy measures known as infitah (opening) that were launched in the 1970s under President Anwar Sadat. After Mubarak came to power following Sadat's assassination, successive governments continued the policy trajectory set by infitah. There were two prongs to this policy, particularly as it unfolded under the aegis of an IMF structural adjustment programme in 1990-91. First, a series of policies began to transform social relations in the rural areas. In 1992, Law 96 of the Egyptian Peoples' Assembly liberalized agricultural rents and allowed for the eviction of tenants by landowners after a five-year transitional period. Rents were raised threefold and – with the encouragement of international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, and U.S. government bodies such as USAID – Egyptian agriculture shifted toward the type of export-oriented production that typifies much of African agriculture today.[5] Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians lost their ability to survive on the land and streamed into the informal sector of urban centers – particularly, but not only, into Cairo.

Second, state employment began to be cut back dramatically with the privatization (wholly or in part) of 209 public sector companies (out of a total of 314) by 2005.[6] The number of workers in these public sector companies was halved from 1994-2001. In the banking sector, nearly 20 per cent of the banking system was transferred from public control to the private sector. The consequence of this wave of privatization – hailed by the IMF in 2006 as having "surpassed expectations"[7] – was a massive downgrading of working conditions and the further impoverishment of wide layers the Egyptian population. This was another contributing factor to the expansion of the army of informal workers that characterize Egyptian cities and have played such a critical role in the recent uprising.

It is in response to these neoliberal measures – and the complicity of the official state-linked trade union movement – that independent forms of worker organizing emerged in an important wave of strikes in 2006-08. During 2006 there were 220 major strikes involving tens of thousands of workers in the largest strike wave that Egypt had seen in decades.[8] These strikes linked up with peasant movements, which aimed at resisting the loss of land due to the neoliberal measures described above. These earlier forms of organization and struggle have been a key element to the historical experiences underpinning the current wave of protests.

But accompanying these neoliberal measures was its natural corollary: the concentration and centralization of wealth in the hands of a tiny layer of the country's elite. As Tim Mitchell has thoroughly described, a key feature of the 1990-91 IMF structural adjustment was the transfer of wealth to the private sector. The result was the strengthening of a handful of massive conglomerates – such as the Osman, Bahgat, and Orascom Groups – whose activities stretched across construction, import/export, tourism, real estate and finance.[9] It was this class that benefited from the privatization process, the access to cheap labour, the government contracts, and the other forms of largesse distributed through the channels of the state.

The result of neoliberalism was the enrichment of a tiny elite concurrent with the immiseration of the vast majority. This is not an aberration of the system – a kind of 'crony capitalism' as some financial commentators have described it – but precisely a normal feature of capitalist accumulation replicated across the world.

So while the outrage at the wealth of Mubarak and the state officials associated with his regime is well deserved, we must not forget that Mubarak – and the Egyptian state as a whole – represented an entire capitalist class. The result of neoliberalism was the enrichment of a tiny elite concurrent with the immiseration of the vast majority. This is not an aberration of the system – a kind of 'crony capitalism' as some financial commentators have described it – but precisely a normal feature of capitalist accumulation replicated across the world. The repressive apparatus of the Egyptian state was aimed at ensuring that the lid was kept on any social discontent arising from these worsening conditions. In this sense, the struggle against the effects of the economic crisis would inevitably be compelled to confront the dictatorial character of the regime.

The Regional Dimension

This uprising cannot be understood without situating it within the regional context. Once again, we can see here the intertwining of the political and economic. U.S. policy in the Middle East is aimed, first and foremost, at keeping the oil and petro-dollar rich Gulf states under its influence. This should not be interpreted as meaning that the U.S. wants to directly own these oil supplies (although this may be part of this process), but that the U.S. wants to ensure that the oil supplies remain outside of the democratic control of the people of the region. The nature of global capitalism and the dominant position of the U.S. state within the world market rests significantly upon its control over the Gulf region. Any move toward a broader democratic transformation of the region could potentially threaten U.S. power at a global level. This is why the U.S. so strongly supports the dictatorships that rule the Gulf states and also why the majority of the labour in the Gulf is performed by temporary, migrant workers who lack all citizenship rights and can be deported at any sign of discontent.

All other relations between the U.S. and other countries in the region are subordinated and linked to this goal of U.S. hegemony over the Gulf region. This includes the U.S.-Israel relationship (which is why any talk of an 'Israel lobby' controlling U.S. foreign policy is nonsense). The U.S. sees Israel as a key pillar of its overall Middle East policy: it is an ally that is fully dependent upon U.S. military and political support and can always be relied upon to act against the interests of the Arab masses. Precisely because Israel has its origins as a settler-colonial state founded upon the dispossession of the Palestinian people, it is seen as a more stable and steadfast pillar of U.S. power than any of the Arab dictatorships that are exposed to threat of popular revolt. This is why the interests of Israel and the Arab dictatorships are coincident, not opposed to one another – as was so clearly illustrated in the recent uprisings of both Tunisia and Egypt.

Beyond the Gulf states and Israel the third leg of U.S. power in the region is the reliance upon autocratic leaders such as Mubarak. But lying behind Mubarak (as with his predecessor Sadat) has always been the Egyptian military. U.S. linkages to Egypt have largely been constructed through the military and this is one of the key reasons why the military plays such a dominant role in the structures of the Egyptian state. The vast amount of military aid that Egypt receives from the U.S. (around $1.4-billion annually) is well-known as is the role that the military has played in supporting U.S. policy across the Middle East (the current head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Mohamed Tantawi, fought alongside U.S. troops in the 1991 Gulf War). The highest ranks of Egypt's military should properly be considered as part of the capitalist class with significant economic interests that overlap with the state and private sector. Precisely because of the military's central role in sustaining U.S. power regionally, and its own stake in the reproduction of Egyptian capitalism, any belief that the Egyptian military is 'part of the people' or 'neutral and above politics' is a very dangerous illusion.[10]

Over the last two decades the linkages between the political and economic configuration of U.S. power in the Middle East has become even more explicit. United States policy has followed a two-pronged track that ties neoliberalism with the normalization of economic and political relations between the Arab world and Israel. The broader goal has been the creation of a single economic zone from Israel to the Gulf states, linked under the dominance of the USA. One of the mechanisms for reaching this goal has been a series of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) signed between the U.S. and Arab states in the region (Morocco, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, and Egypt) that, over time, would be knitted together in a single free trade area enabling the unfettered flow of capital and goods across the region.[11]

The bond between normalization and neoliberalism is powerfully illustrated in the character of these U.S. bilateral FTAs, which include as part of their conditions a requirement to lift any boycott or refusal to trade with Israel. In the case of Egypt (and Jordan) the link is more advanced than any other state in the region, and is best shown in the so-called Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ). These QIZ provide duty free access to the U.S. market for Egyptian exports. But they contain the remarkable provision that a certain proportion of imports (around 12 per cent) must be Israeli in order to qualify for duty-free status. The Egyptian QIZ are concentrated in the textile sector, with 770 companies operating in the zones at the end of 2009. Since the few short years of their existence they have grown to be a significant weight in Egyptian exports to the United States. Egyptian exports from the QIZ grew at an incredible 57 per cent annually between 2005 and 2008, more than ten times the rate of Egypt's exports to the U.S. as a whole.[12] In 2010, QIZ exports made up more than 40 per cent of the value of all of Egypt's exports to the United States.[13]

It is noteworthy that Egyptian activists have raised the demand during the recent uprising to shut down these QIZ. It would be a further powerful step to open the books of these QIZ – accurate and factual information about their operations are notoriously hard to come by and it would be a great service of the Egyptian people to reveal them to the world. It should also be noted that similar QIZ exist in the Jordanian context – with the added twist that many of the workers in the Jordanian QIZ are badly exploited migrants from Asia.

These regional processes thus further confirm the impossibility of separating the 'economic' and 'political' aspects of the current uprisings. The demand to cut ties with Israel and abrogate the regional agreements signed by Sadat and Mubarak are part-and-parcel of resisting the logic of neoliberalism and U.S. power in the region. The authoritarian nature of the state is a direct outcome of these regional processes and, for this reason, if it is to be successful, the struggle for greater political freedom must inevitably take up questions of confronting U.S. dominance of the region and the particular role Israel plays in sustaining that dominance.[14]


The story that has been told in much of the mass media and reinforced by the carefully-worded rhetoric of U.S. and European officials is that these demonstrations have primarily been a struggle to overthrow individual tyrants. There is, of course, a one-sided truth to this: protestors have taken aim at the individual personages of Ben Ali and Mubarak. But the claim that this is a struggle for 'democracy' acts to obfuscate more than clarify what these uprisings are about. Two-thirds of the Egyptian population is under the age of 30. This means that the vast majority of the Egyptian population has not only spent their entire lives under the rule of Hosni Mubarak; they have also endured a very brutal form of neoliberal capitalism. The demonstrations were a direct result of the naked class power embodied by Mubarak's rule. This was, perhaps, no more graphically illustrated than by the way in which the capitalist class essentially fled the country in the first few days of the uprising.[15]

The anti-democratic character of the Egyptian regime is not accidental or a question of individuals, but rather the political form of capitalism in Egypt. It is the necessary way that capitalism functions in a society that is marked by astounding (and ever-widening) levels of inequality, and which is located in a region that is so central to the constitution of U.S. power at a global level. For this reason, the demand for democratic expression in societies characterized by decades of atrophied public space is one facet of a much broader struggle that pivots fundamentally around the question of class. Mubarak was the public face of a military government and removing that face does not change the character of military rule or the way in which that rule sustains the dominance of a particular class. The political form of the Egyptian state is not an ephemera. The role of the Egyptian military cannot be decisively reformed while leaving the structure of capitalism and its regional linkages unchallenged.

This analysis runs precisely opposite to the rhetoric of Obama and other world leaders that whitewashes the West's decades-long support for Mubarak and claims that the Egyptian people's struggle was simply a question of political 'transition.' There is a furious attempt now on behalf of the Egyptian military and elite, the U.S. government and all their regional allies – including Israel – to separate the 'political' and 'economic' characteristics of the popular struggle and confine the struggle to simply a question of Mubarak. This is clearly demonstrated by media reports on 14 February that the military would outlaw strikes and other forms of independent worker organizing. But the struggle against the Egyptian dictatorship remains, in essence, a class struggle. This is not a matter of bombastic pronouncement or an empty political slogan, but an inescapable fact. •

Adam Hanieh teaches in the development studies department at the School of Oriental and African Studies. He can be reached at


1. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance and Growth (Washington: World Bank), p.142.

2. World Bank, p.142.

3. See: David McNally, "Night in Tunisia: Riots, Strikes and a Spreading Insurgency," The Bullet, N. 455, 19 January 2011.

4. IMF, Arab Republic of Egypt – 2010 Article IV Consultation Mission, Concluding Statement, 16 February 2010, 2010.

5. For a detailed description of this process, see: Ray Bush, "Civil Society and the Uncivil State Land Tenure Reform in Egypt and the Crisis of Rural Livelihoods" (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development), Programme Paper, N. 9, May 2004.

6. Angela Joya, "Egyptian Protests: Falling Wages, High Prices and the Failure of an Export-Oriented Economy," The Bullet, N.111, 2 June 2008.

7. IMF, Arab Republic of Egypt: 2006 Article IV Consultation.

8. See Jamie Allison, "Wave of struggle shakes Egyptian regime," Socialist Worker, 7 April 2007.

9. Timothy Mitchell, 'Dreamland: The Neoliberalism of Your Desires,' Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), N. 210, Spring 1999.

10. Also see: Gilbert Achcar, "Whither Egypt?," The Bullet, N. 459, 7 Feburary 2011.

11. See: Adam Hanieh "Palestine in the Middle East: Opposing Neoliberalism and US Power," The Bullet, N. 125, 15 July 2008.

12. Barbara Kotschwar and Jeffrey J. Schott, Reengaging Egypt: Options for US-Egypt Economic Relations, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008, p.20.

13. Calculated from data at

14. Moreover, any solidarity movements in support of regional struggles (such as Palestine) also tend to grow to encompass the nature of the political regime. It is no accident that the antecedents of this uprising are to be found in the protests that emerged in September 2000 in solidarity with the Palestinian intifada. At that time, as the Egyptian socialist Hossam el-Hamalawy has noted, students attempted to come out on to the streets but were crushed by the regime. See: Mark Levine, "Interview with Hossam el-Hamalawy," The Bullet, N. 456, 31 January 2011.

15. It was reported in the early days of the uprising that Egypt's largest business owners flew out on 19 planes to Dubai where they hoped to ride out the storm of the uprising.

Posted by muslimmalaysia786 on February 27, 2011 · Leave a

Posted: 27 Feb 2011 07:47 AM PST

Posted by muslimmalaysia786 on February 27, 2011 · Leave a Comment (Edit)

Hello voters! Lemme introduce myself- my name is Rosmah. I am your new Prime Minister! Chillax, guys. That a joke. But seriously, it's time you got to know who I am. The real me. Let's not get into the surname at this point. I am 38 years old. Which means i am old enough to decide.

Old enough to know what i want in life (everything !) . Not because I am a spoilt brat. Not because I believe it's my birthright. But because I am worth it! Well, are you ready to hear this? I want to be a politician. A top politician. Like the rest of my family. We start at the top, and stay there! Lucky, na? My family has been an amazing PM. My hubby was super amazing .


Filed under Uncategorized

As for my great-grandad -come on, he's a legend. My great-great-grandad … never mind. I don't want to show off. Especially not about my master. By the way, he is still the most powerful person in Malaysia. So strict and so fantastic.  ex PM too. But he preferred to let someone else get there. My master listened to his inner voice and look where it tookhim! he has taught me to listen to my inner voice as well.

And that voice is telling me to take the plunge into politics -why wait? UMNO politics is kinda a family biz, if you know what I mean. It's certainly in my jeans, err…genes. Everybody in my family is connected in some way to politics. I find politics really cool.
Dunno how my hubby feels about my career choice. But my huuby such a dude -he'll be totally good with the woman. Not so sure about master's reaction, either. he wasn't too hot on woman jumping into politics, and maybe master was right. But it's a different story today-  he knows there's nobody else to take our dynasty forward at this point. My brother RPK is way too young. That leaves me! I really love my MASTER
Malaysia is like a really young country -right ? I am young! You know what? Our generation is fully fed up. We can't stand those old 'NIK MATSj and ANWARIS' who are forever pain in ass on how to run MALAYSIA Considering the big, fat mess they've made of this place, it's time they handed the state over to us. Guys, i want to make one thing clear at this point. Trust me, my getting into politics has nothing to do with power, money and all that.
I just feel politics is in my blood and I'll be brilliant at it! Why pretend to be modest? master thinks so, too. Last time we went to a polo match, he told me he had a lot of faith in my skills and abilities (i ski really well!) . He also said he is very proud of all my achievements. my first hubby keeps nagging me to slow. But let's be honest -nobody has studied all that much in our family, except for our ancestors. And we've all done just fine. I know I'll have to prove myself in politics -but i have to start somewhere, right? master says, start at the top, that's the best place. I agree.
Grassroots work can come later. See how well my master did; he just took a few helicopter rides to small villages across the country, talked to some poor people there, ate nasi bungus and quickly understood their problems. That was it! People appreciated his sincerity and hard work. He told everybody the true meaning of one umno-barisan. I want to carry forward that legacy. See, i don't need 'contacts' . I understand how to get things done -my mastersays I have inherited this trait from my great-master . Frankly, I think i get it from my RPK. Whatever!

In this day and age, we need to speak a new language; we need to communicate better. 2020 is a landmark year for the world. malaysia the super  today -all thanks to my master and my RPK and HUBBY's efforts. But there are still a few old issues that need to be sorted. I am not talking about corruption . We all know that will never go. My focus is going to be on other stuff. I studied micro-financing in high school -damn good teacher! My campaign is going to be based on this concept. I'll beg my bro RPK to become my campaign manager.


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She's the best! RPK will handle everything else -he's also the best. I have already picked my team -you guys are going to love this -loads of Bollywood stars in my future cabinet. These people are the only ones who understand the pulse of Malaysia Our entire strategy is youth-based -forget issues . Our candidates will be chosen on their box-office performance.
They have to be tops in the looks department. Hot bods make a huge difference on posters and in TV commercials. Our research shows voters want candidates in designer gea-they are sick of those old, pot-bellied netas in crumpled kurta -pajamas . Imagine how super cool and colour-coordinated parliamentary proceedings will look during live broadcasts with my team. We want Malaysia  to seriously rock, that's our motto
This is my party's promise, guys. Party on! As in political party, yaar -what were you thinking! Our time starts in 2011 -may the cutest hotties win!

Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak's wife Rosmah Mansor today defended herself against what she called opposition "lies" about her, during an unlikely by-election appearance at the all-important Felda settlements in Kerdau today.
Hitting the campaign trail to whip up support for BN's candidate Syed Ibrahim Syed Ahmad, the self-proclaimed 'First Lady of Malaysia' urged voters to reject the allegations and lies brandished against her by Pakatan Rakyat.
"Look at my face until you are satisfied. Do I look like a liar? I don't, right?," she told some 200 settlers of Felda Jengka 25.
Rosmah, or Kak Mah to a privileged few, denied repeated claims by the opposition that she controls her husband Najib, and that she splurged on cosmetics treatment to prepare for her keynote address at a recent international education conference in Saudi Arabia.
'When have I told (Najib), do this, do that? I want him to listen to what I say, (but) for me, when he says sit, I sit lah," she quipped.
Recounting her visit to the Saudi city of Riyadh, Rosmah explained that her reasons for going was to accept an honour bestowed by the Arab nation, rare for a foreigner and more so a woman.
She stressed that she had agreed to the trip – on the invitation of the Saudi government – after the queen and the king's daughter had both personally contacted her about the visit and had invited her for dinner with them.
"I am not talking big about myself, I simply want to show that I did not go there for fun, not to be happy-happy."
'Help him, he will help you'
Rosmah urged Kerdau's voters to judge for themselves and not believe everything they hear about her from the opposition.
"Don't listen to their lies. The opposition simply says things. Alhamdulillah. I don't want to fight (the opposition's claims), I will leave it to Allah," she said.
Moving on to BN's candidate Syed Ibrahim (left), Rosmah pointed out that she has endured the heat and sweat to campaign for the Al-Azhar University graduate, on Najib's request.
"All I ask is for 30 minutes (to vote for Syed Ibrahim). If he wins tomorrow, whatever problems you have, go and knock on his front door.
"If he does not do anything, tell me," she said with a smirk.
Earlier, Rosmah spent most of the morning visiting several houses in the Felda settlement, meeting with residents and asking about the problems the locals faced.
Syed Ibrahim is in a straight fight with PAS candidate Hassanuddin Salim for the Kerdau state seat in Pahang. Polling day is set for March 6, simultaneously with the Merlimau state by-election in Malacca.


Translate This Into Votes

Posted: 27 Feb 2011 06:34 AM PST

For all the ruckus that the Indians have been whipping up over the 'Interlok' issue, it looks like the Chinese have been insulted far worse in the novel.

And yet, they appear to be quite unruffled.

The writer of 'Interlok', Ibrahim Hussein has attempted to depict the Chinese in all sorts of ways - greedy, fat (yes, even that), evil, heartless (they sell their kids), cunning, desperate (no future in their own country that they had to go to the extent of being a nightsoil carrier), rapists, drug-users etc.

And the Indians are complaining about 'pariah'.

That being said, the Chinese have always had a high sense of self-esteem, some justified and others not.

I can imagine the average Chinese thinking smugly, "Say what you may about us, but we own the economy." Which is true.

But there are other issues involved.

This whole exercise of using an obviously inferior book as examination material is for a subtle exercise known in psychology circles as "priming".

Priming is a way of conditioning the human mind to think in a certain manner and even behave as such.

Wikipedia says: The effects of priming can be very salient and long lasting, even more so than simple recognition memory[2]. Unconscious priming effects can affect word choice on a word-stem completion test long after the words have been consciously forgotten.

This is precisely the effect the BN government wants in the minds of young, impressionable Malaysian children.

They want to establish the underlying notion that:

a) All Chinese are out to get the Malays
b) Indians are low class
c) Malays have been wronged and deserve better (creating a sense of entitlement)

Perhaps the effect may not be seen immediately. But I assure you that the effects will be seen a few years down the road.

In fact, our current generation of Malaysians are unable to think for themselves, preferring instead to have other make decisions for them.

The Chinese may feel that the general elections are the best place to sock it to the government.

I hope the Indians remember this too, and when the next elections come round, not a single one should vote for BN.

Interlok: Sex scene, rape scenes, suicide by hanging
Interlok: Cunning Chinese swindles Malay, evicts him like a mangy dog
Interlok: Chinese immigrants came here to carry shit buckets

Genocide in Libya - Is Malaysia Next???

Posted: 27 Feb 2011 03:21 AM PST

What's the difference between Libya and Malaysia. Time for Regime Change.

By Anak Mami

Very disturbing picture showing Libyan army officers & soldiers tied up & then killed by Gaddafi & his mercenaries because they refused to open fire on civilians. Please be aware this video has footage of dead bodies. Reports are saying that Mugabe of Zimbabwe is sending mercenaries & commandos to help Gaddafi

The irony of religion is that because of it's power to divert man to destructive courses, the world really could come to an end. The plain fact is religion must die for mankind to live. The hour is getting very late to be able to indulge

this guy is going down worse then Saddam did...seriously funny thing is, every damn leader in the Middle East, is using the exact same agenda, ...blaming other countries and organizations which is pretty week and lame..dividing and conquering his ppl, letting lose criminals and thugs...seriously DON'T THEY EVER LEARN from others mistakes..but then again, no one ever learns from history!..this is very disturbing...something has got to give

please don't miss the video

Admin Note:

Now right here in Malaysia under the BN/Umno Regime, similar scenes are played in the streets of Kuala Lumpur just as we have witnessed in Cairo, Tunis, Tripoli, Manama etc. Just like Egypt and Tunisia, the BN/Umno Regime will also fall with People Power. Why you think Najib, Muhydeen, Mahathir keep on saying that what is happening in the Middle East will not happen in Malaysia. Watch this from Malaysiakini

Posted: 26 Feb 2011 10:11 PM PST

HINDRAF Racism Rally - Report From KLCC

Posted: 26 Feb 2011 10:09 PM PST

Someone told me that this was supposed to be a citizen's rally.

Perhimpunan orang ramai, my @$$!!! It was more of a perhimpunan polis!! When I got there a while after 9am, the place was crawling with blue shirts.

I got off at the Ampang Park station just in case the KLCC station was closed. As I exited, I ran into at least 3 cops.

Feigning innocence, I asked, "Why are there so many policemen here?"

"An illegal assembly," he muttered apologetically. I thanked him and walked on.

Cops and trucks amidst the normal traffic

When I reached KLCC, I saw them in full force. They stopped me and asked to see to see my IC. I happily complied. They asked me what I did for a living.

I promptly replied.

"Where did I work?" they also wanted to know. I had no qualms about providing them with the answer.

"Why are you here?" they asked.

"Shopping," I said, with my best butter-wouldn't-melt-in-my-mouth look.

They looked at me disbelievingly. Finally, since it appeared that there was no conclusive evidence that I was there for the rally, they let me go. "If I see you out here again, I'm going to arrest you," the cop warned me as I departed.

We'll see about that, I thought.

The cops were getting weary

Those cops were sitting there at 9:30am. They were still there when I left at about 12:30pm. They looked weary. :-)

It's my party and I'll cry if I want to...

Some of the cops sought shade under those trees. I counted at least 5 trucks in the area. There was even a canine unit there, for some reason. I also caught sight of a unit bergerak - don't have a clue what that was for (it looked like a first aid centre).

Tourists gawked at the fire power in the vicinity

Tourists were happily snapping away. I guess this is not a common sight in their country.

I had trouble getting around because of my race. Judging by some of the reports from other witnesses, it looks like I was super-lucky not to get arrested.

At 6:30am, they were busy arresting any Indian who was visible in the KLCC region.

Be firm with Hindraf, bro Hisham!

Posted: 26 Feb 2011 07:34 PM PST

My advise to Home Minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein - do not bow to Hindraf and do not reverse a decision by the police in rejecting them a demonstration permit (to be held today at the KL Convention Centre).

Accusation that our government opposes peaceful demonstrations (read Malaysiakini) is a blatant 'anti-unity punchline' by some anti-Malaysia groups, including the 'pro-communist' news portal trying to be heroes of absolute freedom.

Afterall, Hindraf was planning the demo to avow their disgust at 'Interlok', a controversial novel now suspended as a Form 5 literature reference. And knowing Hindraf and how they operate, there wont be any 'peaceful' demo!

One of its leaders Moorthy even went overboard by asking the Indian Government to severe all trade and economic ties with Malaysia. He feels more Indian than a Malaysian citizen. In fact, members of the organisation think they are not Malaysians at all, unlike Malaysian Chinese who are proud to be Malaysians (they never asked mainland China to take any action against Malaysia).

It think it is time for Hisham to re-evaluate the social and political condition in the country. Although some people criticised him for his adamant and late action in the past, I believe he got reason not to be too harsh in any actions. However, I believe he has done quite a good job and can improve further.

To Hindraf leaders, do reconsider your 'fight for nothing'. If you feel Malaysia is not your country, may as well go back to where your ancestors came from and see whether their system is much better than that of Malaysia.

Unless if you consider yourself as Malaysians, learn more about the country and its people, its unique multiracial society and politics. Malaysia is not India as there is no Malays over there... and the Malays have been very, very tolerant!

You are also part of the reasons why ISA must stay...

Felda swing critical for PAS win

Posted: 26 Feb 2011 03:11 AM PST

PAS needs to gain a substantial swing in votes in the three Felda and one Felcra settlements of the Kerdau constituency in Pahang if it hopes to win the coming by-election, said candidate Hassanuddin Salim.
Views: 219
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Time: 06:15 More in News & Politics

Nomination scenes in Kerdau

Posted: 25 Feb 2011 11:53 PM PST

7.30am: Kerdau - The sun is fiercely bright over Temerloh town, where the battle for the Kerdau state seat will begin today. Police have cordoned off Dewan Tun Razak, where the nomination of candidates will take place, putting up a perimeter of iron fencing and barbwire since yesterday evening. The roads leading to the nomination centre have also been blocked by the police as early as dawn. PAS supporters have assembled at Plaza Temerloh, some 500 metres from Dewan Tun Razak, as early as 5.30am to say prayers and get ready for the march to the nomination centre, while BN supporters have assembled at Dataran Temerloh, an equal distance away, from 7am. Blow-by-blow here:
Views: 233
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Time: 06:40 More in News & Politics

Straight fights in double by-elections Merlimau scenes

Posted: 25 Feb 2011 10:28 PM PST

7.08am: Merlimau - The sky is pink as the sun rises in Merlimau and police, party workers and the media take their places in their respective duty areas n this slightly windy day. Police have set up barricades, barbwire and several trucks as a buffer between the PAS and BN supporters who are slowly trickling in. BN's starting point for its march is about 200 metres from the nomination centre, while PAS is starting some 500 metres away. Blow-by-blow here:
Views: 99
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Time: 07:10 More in News & Politics

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